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Abstract 
Agent-based modeling is a longstanding but under-used method that allows researchers to 
simulate artificial worlds for hypothesis testing and theory building. Agent-based models 
(ABMs) offer unprecedented control and statistical power by allowing researchers to precisely 
specify the behavior of any number of agents and observe their interactions over time. ABMs are 
especially useful when investigating group behavior or evolutionary processes, and can uniquely 
reveal non-linear dynamics and emergence—the process whereby local interactions aggregate 
into often-surprising collective phenomena, such as spatial segregation and relational homophily. 
We review several illustrative ABMs, describe the strengths and limitations of this method, and 
address two misconceptions about ABMs: reductionism and “you get out what you put in.” We 
also offer maxims for good and bad ABMs, give practical tips for beginner modelers, and 
include a list of resources and other models. We conclude with a 7-step guide to creating your 
own model. 
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Agent-Based Modeling: A Guide for Social Psychologists 
From Detroit to El Paso, New York to Los Angeles, urban environments are divided by 
race and ethnicity. The pernicious consequences of segregation lead us to infer pernicious 
causes: people must live in homogenous neighborhoods because they are racist. This explanation 
for segregation seems plausible, as prejudiced individuals do avoid people of other races—but it 
assumes that the collective behavior of neighborhoods can be explained similarly to the behavior 
of individuals. Almost 40 years ago, Thomas Schelling (1971) challenged this assumption, 
asking whether segregated neighborhoods would form even when individuals had no prejudice, 
and only wanted a few neighbors similar to themselves. 
Schelling placed red and green pennies on a chessboard to represent people in 
neighborhoods. People were happy—and remained in their square—if they were surrounded by 
at least 30% of their “color;” if this number dropped below 30%, however, people became 
unhappy and moved to a new square. Schelling played out this model by moving pennies one-by-
one until each person on the board was happy, by which time the board was highly color-
segregated. At higher (75%) or lower (15%) thresholds of similarity, segregation was more or 
less pronounced (see Figure 1 for an illustration of these effects), but the key is that even 
individuals who embraced high diversity could still end up segregated.  
Schelling’s work is an elegant testament to how simple and innocent individual 
preferences can produce surprising societal outcomes over time. His model also serves as a 
prototypical—if low-tech—example of the power of agent-based modeling (ABM)1 in 
understanding emergent social behavior. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  While we use the term “agent-based modeling” in this paper, the terminology around ABM is 
diverse and potentially confusing. Alternative terms include “multi-agent systems,” “agent-based 
simulation,” “agent-based computing,” and “individual-based modeling.”	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Figure 1. Visualization of Thomas Schelling’s (1971) segregation model at its commencement 
(top panel) and conclusion (bottom panels). When agents have a 15% threshold for similarity 
(left panel), only minimal segregation occurs. However, 30% (middle panel) and 75% (right 
panel) thresholds produce striking segregation. Figure retrieved from 
http://nifty.stanford.edu/2014/mccown-schelling-model-segregation/.  
 
Agent-Based Modeling 
Agent-based models (ABMs) are computational simulations in which artificial entities 
interact over time within customized environments. These entities (“agents”) are programmed to 
represent humans who behave in precisely specified ways. As summarized by Macy and Flache 
(2009, p. 247), agents are adaptive in that they respond to their environment through learning and 
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evolution and are autonomous in that they control their own goals, states, and behaviors. They 
are also intentionally simplified, usually following only one or two basic rules (representing 
habits, norms, or preferences) throughout the simulation.  
 The outcomes of ABMs, however, are anything but simple. A well-programmed model 
offers insight into how local interactions between agents can lead to complex group- and system-
level phenomena. Consider how a single bird’s tendency to align and remain close (but not too 
close) to her peers can create a swirling flock that appears to be moving with a collective mind 
(Reynolds, 1987), or how predator-prey interdependence can explain animal species’ resurgence 
following near extinction (Borschev & Filippov, 2004). ABMs are uniquely equipped to shed 
light on such phenomena and countless other applications involving interacting individuals. 
Perhaps because of their ability to simulate large-scale dynamics with bottom-up 
processes, ABMs are popular in economics (e.g. Tesfatsion & Judd, 2006), sociology (Bruch & 
Atwell, 2015; Macy & Willer, 2002), political science (Cederman, 2005; Johnson, 1999), and 
some applied sciences (e.g. artificial intelligence; Beer, 1995; Gasser, Braganza, & Herman, 
1987; Wooldridge, 2003). In psychology, however, ABMs continue to exist at the field’s 
margins (see Goldstone & Janssen, 2005; Smith & Conrey, 2007), perhaps because psychologists 
view them as difficult to implement and see their results as only reflecting the assumptions of 
their programmers (“you get out what you put in”).  
This paper aims to address these concerns and to pique social psychologists’ interest in 
ABMs. We provide examples of classic and recent ABMs that illuminate social behavior, 
compare modeling to other methods in social psychology, and give concrete advice to social 
psychologists wishing to implement their own ABMs. Although there are ABMs that simulate 
non-social events (e.g. weather patterns or artificial intelligence), we focus on models of social 
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processes. We hope to provide an in-depth but accessible introduction to ABM for social 
psychologists.  
Social Psychological Questions Addressed by ABMs 
Schelling (1971)’s model of segregation addresses one of social psychology’s core 
questions: Why do individuals segregate based on race? ABMs also address other important 
questions: What is the basis of group formation? What is the best strategy for maintaining 
cooperation? Why do couples pair off in terms of attractiveness? These questions are well-suited 
to ABM because they involve individual behaviors interacting to produce surprising collective 
phenomena.  
What is the Basis of Group Formation?  
Social identity is the dominant framework for understanding why people split into “us” 
versus “them:” people with similar race, religion or culture form groups, which then square off 
against each other (Tajfel, 1982). However, these social identities can only emerge once people 
separate into groups. This logic creates a regress in which groups require identity but identity 
requires groups. To escape this chicken-egg dilemma, Gray and colleagues (2014) examined 
whether groups could form in a completely homogeneous population without any identities. The 
authors programmed agents with only two simple characteristics: reciprocity (the tendency to 
cooperate with those who have previously cooperated with you) and transitivity (the tendency to 
share your network’s social preferences)—each of which was a well-established social tendency 
(Holland & Leinhardt, 1971; Levine, 1998). The model’s results revealed robust group formation 
even though agents had no sense of “us” or “them,” suggesting that groups can form even 
without identity (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Visualization of Gray and colleagues’ (2014) model displayed at round 1 (left panel) 
and round 300 (right panel). Figure retrieved from online simulation at 
http://www.mpmlab.org/groups/.  
 
What is the Best Strategy for Maintaining Cooperation?  
Real-world questions of cooperation are captured by the “prisoner’s dilemma,” in which 
two people each have the choice to cooperate or defect. The group payoff is maximized when 
both people cooperate, but each player is made better off individually by defecting—capturing 
the essential tension of social dilemmas. Political scientist Robert Axelrod asked people to 
program agents with different strategies for repeated prisoner dilemma games (e.g., always 
cooperate, always defect, copy your partner’s past behavior), and then paired these agents with 
each other in a round-robin design (Axelrod, 1980; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). As long as the 
agents engaged in repeated interactions, the winner was a very simple agent—“tit-for-tat”—
which began with cooperation, and then copied its partner’s previous decision. Axelrod’s ABM 
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was important because it revealed a simple route for the emergence of cooperation, even in 
complex societies. 
 More recently, Bear and Rand (2016) developed an ABM to explore the psychological 
basis of cooperation. Agents played either one-shot or repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. They could 
engage in two different kinds of cognition: a low-cost generalized intuitive response, or a higher-
cost calculated response that could tailor its choice to whether the game was one-shot or 
repeated. The results showed that—given a high likelihood of repeated interaction—the best 
strategy was to intuitively cooperate and deliberatively defect when the game was one-shot. This 
ABM therefore offered an evolutionary explanation for why people sometimes cooperate when 
they can get away with defection.    
Do Couples Seek out Similarly Attractive Partners?   
Members of a romantic couple tend to be similarly attractive, but it is not immediately 
clear why. Although some believed that people intentionally search for their attractiveness 
“match” (Huston, 1973; White, 1980), Kalick and Hamilton (1986) used an ABM to test whether 
matching could occur even if all people preferred maximally attractive partners. Heterosexual 
male and female agents were assigned an attractiveness score from 1 to 10, and were repeatedly 
paired up. Pairs asked each other on “dates” and if both agreed, they left the pool, otherwise they 
were paired up with new agents. Kalick and Hamilton ran two variations of the model: one in 
which people wanted maximally attractive partners (motivated for supermodels) and another 
where people wanted similarly attractive partners (motivated for matching). In the “motivated for 
matching” condition, agents’ attractiveness was very highly correlated (r = .85) with their 
partners’—significantly higher than what actually occurs in real life. In contrast, agents who 
were “motivated for supermodels” had their attractiveness moderately correlated (r = .5) with 
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their partners’—nearly the same correlation as in real life (Critelli & Waid, 1980). This moderate 
matching occurred because when everyone preferred the prettiest people, the prettiest ended up 
together first, and the less pretty were left to pair up afterwards. As with many ABMs, people’s 
individual preferences (for attractive partners) led to unexpected collective patterns 
(attractiveness matching).  
Emergence 
Agents in the previous examples were not programmed to segregate, to form social 
groups, to maintain stable cooperation, or to find partners of a similar attractiveness. Instead, 
these group phenomena arose via emergence—when the aggregation of small-scale individual 
behavior yields qualitatively different collective behavior. Emergence lies at the heart of almost 
any complex phenomenon, from traffic jams, to the wetness of water, to the neural basis of 
consciousness (Bassett & Gazzaniga, 2011; Tononi, Sporns, & Edelman, 1994). For example, 
while no individual neuron is conscious, their collective interactions yield human consciousness. 
Likewise, Schelling’s model revealed that segregation could arise from the innocent decisions of 
relatively egalitarian individuals. 
Historically, the impact of ABMs has been proportional to the amount of emergence they 
reveal—the apparent disconnect between individual and collective behavior. For example, the 
models from the previous section feature large-scale phenomena that are difficult to predict from 
individuals’ behavior. Importantly, in explaining complex group-level phenomena with simple 
individual-level rules (see Smaldino, 2014), good ABMs typically reduce complexity—leading 
to these two complementary maxims for research with ABM:  
 
AGENT-BASED MODELING 
	   10	  
Maxim for Good ABMs: Reduce complexity by revealing how higher-level phenomena emerge 
from the repeated interaction of simple rules. 
Maxim for Bad ABMs: Introduce complexity by taking a simple phenomenon and inventing 
complicated rules to explain it. 
 
 These maxims serve as useful criteria in evaluating whether ABMs add to or detract from 
a paper. The very best ABMs are explainable in plain prose and should reveal the emergence of 
complex or surprising phenomena using simple principles. Conversely, bad ABMs take a 
straightforward, intuitive phenomenon and complicate it with unjustified assumptions and 
abstruse mathematics. These maxims also help to address two traditional criticisms of ABMs. 
Reductionism 
ABMs are often seen to be reductionist, destroying the specialness of psychological 
processes by explaining them with simple agent behaviors. For example, claims of reductionism 
have been leveled against research linking love to hormones—if hormones are involved in love, 
is love “just” hormones? But fears of reductionism ignore the possibility of emergence, and the 
fact that all phenomena are embedded in a chain of lower and higher level events. Even if love 
can be “reduced” to hormones, there is still an undeniably powerful feeling of love, a higher-
level emergent experience that motivates people to write sonnets and run through the airport at 
the last minute. Emergence also provides a defense against claims of reductionism in ABMs. 
Even if reciprocity and transitivity are sufficient conditions for group genesis (Gray et al., 2014), 
groups themselves prompt powerful feelings of solidarity and important behaviors—from war to 
religious movements—which cannot be reduced to these lower-level processes.  
You Get Out What You Put In 
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Critics of ABM have also claimed that the results of ABMs are closely tied to 
researchers’ decisions in setting their models’ parameters. In some sense, this is a strength of 
ABMs: unlike in the laboratory or the field, the behavior of agents can be isolated and specified 
with precision—which forces researchers to explicitly formulate their theories. ABM-derived 
hypotheses are therefore decidedly falsifiable, with no ambiguity about what a model should 
predict. Of course, this level of experimenter control has the potential to make the final outcome 
seem obvious—but again, this criticism holds primarily with models that fail to show emergence. 
In Schelling (1971) there is nothing obvious about a slight preference for similarity causing 
rampant segregation, and in Gray and colleagues (2014), there is nothing obvious about two 
simple rules of interaction—reciprocity and transitivity—leading to stable grouping within 
homogenous populations. 
Comparing ABM to other Methods 
In addition to the theoretical framework of emergence, ABMs offer several 
methodological advantages that complement other methods. In comparison to laboratory 
experiments, field studies, or archival investigations (including “big data” analysis), ABMs offer 
a unique combination of experimental control and massive scale, along with the ability to capture 
nonlinearities and underlying mechanisms. However, like any tool in a social psychologist’s 
toolbox, ABMs come with limitations, of which external validity is most notable. This drawback 
is mitigated by supplementing ABMs with other tools—such as laboratory or field 
experiments—in multi-method investigations. Table 1 shows a comparison of the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of ABMs compared to other methods. 
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Table 1. Comparing ABMs to Other Methods 
 Field studies Lab experiment Archival studies ABMs 
Control and Realism Low Control; 
High Realism 
Medium Control; 
Medium Realism 
Low Control; 
Medium Realism 
High Control; 
Low Realism 
Scale Medium to High 
Scale 
Low to Medium 
Scale High Scale High Scale 
Nonlinear Dynamics Medium Visibility Low Visibility Medium Visibility High Visibility 
Mechanism Medium Clarity High Clarity Low Clarity High Clarity 
     
 
Control and Realism 
In psychology, maximum control is often ascribed to experimental lab paradigms 
featuring random assignment, but even experiments have their limits. Participants may respond 
differently to experimental manipulations based on their cultural background (Hong et al., 2003) 
their religious upbringing (Shariff, Willard, Anderson, & Norenzayan, 2016), or even their 
transient mood (Forgas, 1995). Despite the flexibility of experiments, they are also limited by 
questions of ethics and feasibility—there is only so much that participants can do (or be asked to 
do) in the lab. In contrast, ABMs offer exceptional control: agents in computational models can 
be instructed to perform almost any initial behaviors, and will follow their instructions with 
complete uniformity. This control also remains high over indefinitely large samples and 
infinitely long simulations. 
The tradeoff to ABMs’ high control is a low degree of external validity. For example, the 
agents in Schelling’s model moved neighborhoods without incurring the financial or social costs 
inherent in relocation. Kalick and Hamilton’s date choice model similarly assumed that 
individuals who accept dates permanently leave the dating pool, which seldom occurs in real life. 
Because of these shortcomings, ABMs are most effective when used in conjunction with 
laboratory or field experiments, which can use human subjects to validate an ABM’s parameters 
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(as in Luhmann & Rajaram, 2015) or its causal pathways (see Bear & Rand, 2016; Kalick & 
Hamilton, 1986). 
Scale 
One clear advantage of ABMs over other methods is statistical power. Obtaining 
sufficient N can prove difficult, as researchers struggle against a subject pool deadline or limited 
funding for participants. Even in field studies, researchers may obtain large sample sizes but 
these samples may be incomplete or feature troublesome attrition. In ABMs, sample size is 
simply a parameter specified in the model. ABMs can also operate over any amount of time and 
sample at any rate. Of course, large N, long-term and high sampling-rate ABMs may take longer 
to run, but this typically means extras days and not years (and computing superclusters can 
substantially reduce this time). The critical point is that by analyzing large samples over an 
extended time, ABMs can reveal large-scale societal emergence (e.g. segregation and 
homophily), which is often impossible to observe with more traditional paradigms (and even 
with “big data” analyses; Lewis, 2015).  
Nonlinear dynamics 
Most social psychology paradigms often only assess the behavior of one group at one 
specific time-point, but social processes unfold dynamically across time and individuals. 
Consider conformity: people generally follow behaviors more as they become more common 
(Asch, 1956; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & McElreath, 2003), except for non-conformists 
who follow the behavior less (Efferson, Lalive, Richerson, McElreath, & Lubell, 2008). As a 
result, conformity follows an oscillating pattern of increases, decreases, and stability, which is 
difficult to fully capture with static experiments (Jarman, Nowak, Borkowski, Serfass, Wong, & 
Vallacher, 2015). The spread of social attitudes (Nowak, Szamrej, & Latane, 1990) and 
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stereotypes (Kashima et al., 2000) and the process of group formation (Halberstadt et al., 2016; 
Jackson, Halberstadt, Jong, & Feldman, 2015) also follow non-linear patterns. In fact, there are 
few social phenomena that behave truly linearly over time, given the dynamic nature of social-
cultural interactions and the unpredictable impacts of initial conditions (Vallacher & Nowak, 
1999). ABMs are an ideal method for modeling these non-linear processes, as they can include 
millions of time-points and multiple runs (Abbott, 1988).  
Mechanism 
 With their high controllability, ABMs are often able to isolate and directly manipulate the 
discrete psychological processes underlying complex social phenomena. Of course, 
psychological mechanisms can take many forms, and can exist on many levels of analysis. 
ABMs are best suited to study how manifestations of individual (or dyadic) behavior influence 
larger scale group-level phenomena, such as when a slight individual desire for similarity 
catalyzes neighborhood segregation (Schelling, 1971). One question is whether the mechanism 
provided by ABM is the same in real life: just because a mechanism sufficiently generates some 
outcome does not mean this mechanism necessarily or always generates the outcome. However, 
revealing even likely mechanisms is valuable for both basic research and policy decisions.  
Building an ABM 
After being inspired by ABM’s rich history and unique methodology, readers might want 
to try their hand at model-building. While training in ABMs is absent from most PhD programs 
in social psychology, many articles have linked ABMs to specific research questions (e.g., 
Axelrod, 1997; Carley, 2002; Schelling, 1971) with others providing more detailed, technical 
guides (e.g., Smith & Collins, 2009; Smith & Conrey, 2007). An edited volume by Tesfatsion 
and Judd (2006) includes chapters on ABM’s history and its applications in economics, as well 
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as an introductory appendix with extensive practical tips for newcomers. Gilbert and Troitzsch 
(2005) provide a broader overview of ABM in the social sciences. Epstein (2008) includes a 
discussion of ABM's benefits over other methodologies, and Nowak (2004) gives an in-depth 
overview of emergence in ABM and the utility of simple models for simulating complex 
processes. Journal issues focusing on ABMs have included American Behavioral Scientist (Vol 
42, August 1999); Science (Vol 284, April 1999); and the Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences (Vol. 99, Supplement 3, 2002). Finally, websites like “OpenABM” 
(www.openabm.org) and “Agent-Based Models” (www.agent-based-models.com) provide 
courses, videos, and code libraries of previous models from which researchers can adapt code.  
Aspiring ABMers must develop some level of computer programming. Python, 
MATLAB, R, and C have often been previously used to program ABMs. However, there are also 
more accessible tools available for those who do not have time to master a traditional 
programming language. The software package Netlogo (http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/; 
Tisue & Wilensky, 2004) is free and relatively simple, and provides the code and explanation 
behind several of the models in this paper, such as the predator-prey model, the flocking model, 
and Schelling’s segregation model. Netlogo also comes with an extensive manual for researchers 
to learn the programming language as well as practical tips for building an ABM. Other tools 
that offer ABM training include Swarm (Minar, Burkhart, Langton, & Askenazi, 1996), which 
requires some programming ability (C or Java) but comes with a tutorial and example code to get 
new users started, and FLAME (Flexible Large-Scale Agent Modeling Environment) which is a 
more accessible computational environment, since models are specified in XML. Cellular 
Automaton Explorer offers a manageable interface to program simple ABMs and is particularly 
AGENT-BASED MODELING 
	   16	  
well-suited for demonstration purposes (see, for example, a popular Wolfram demonstration: 
http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/CellularAutomatonExplorer/).  
To augment these resources, we provide a 7-step conceptual ABM algorithm, with each 
step illustrated by Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and Gray and colleagues’ (2014) 
grouping model. For more examples of the seven steps, we also provide a substantial (though not 
exhaustive) supplemental table with 35 additional ABMs on social-psychology topics ranging 
from the dynamics of online chatting to decisions about expressing pain. This collection offers 
insight into how other researchers have translated their research question into simulations.  
Some of these steps do not apply to all models or all research questions, and so 
researchers should feel free to adapt them to their own needs. Nevertheless, the steps provide a 
useful guide for exploring social processes and for creating simulated worlds with the potential 
for collective emergence. 
1. What are your world’s dimensions? Is your world flat or multidimensional? Schelling’s 
segregation model is 2D—like land—but group formation models are often multi-
dimensional to represent complex social spheres (although these models often still involve 
2D visualizations to present data). In choosing the dimensionality, researchers must 
consider if the actions of one agent necessarily constrain the behavior of other agents—the 
more mutual constraints, the lower the degrees of freedom and the lower the 
dimensionality (e.g., if I move across town from you, I not only move further from you, 
but also your neighbor). Note that dimensions only apply to models where interactions 
between agents are governed by space. In network models, for example, there are no 
dimensions.  
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Application of Step 1. In Schelling’s model, agents were paired in a two-dimensional 
space (as illustrated in Figure 1), while in Gray and colleagues’ grouping model, agents 
interacted in a multidimensional space where one agent’s position did not impede other 
agents’ movement.  
2. How do agents meet? Behavior in ABMs is usually divided into rounds, and on each 
round, some number of agents interact with each other.  One question is how to select 
which agents interact. Do they interact only with their neighbors, or can they be paired up 
with any other agent in the simulation? These choices stem in part from the 
dimensionality (see Step 1), but there are other choices within each of these sets. In some 
models, agents can avoid interactions entirely—perhaps because they are “unpopular”—
while in others, agents can interact with more than one agent. In the latter case, what 
rules will govern interaction order? And will agents prioritize some interaction partners 
over others? Will interactions be governed randomly or according to a rule (or a bit of 
both)? The answers to these questions (along with your world’s dimensionality) will 
determine the network you choose for your model. Three popular networks are displayed 
in Figure 3.  
Application of Step 2. Since Schelling’s segregation model focused on neighborhood 
dynamics, he programmed agents to only interact with their next-door neighbors. In 
contrast, Gray and colleagues’ agents could interact with any other agent in the model, 
though they were more likely to interact with “friends” than with “enemies”—and they 
only interacted with one partner per round.    
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Figure 3. In the lattice network (A), agents only interact with their neighbors (applicable to 
residential models). In the small-world network (B), cross-network connections compliment 
neighboring connections, so that any two agents are connected by only a few degrees of 
separation (applicable to almost any social network). In the scale-free network (C), densely 
connected agents are more likely to generate new connections compared to sparsely connected 
agents (applicable to the internet and citation networks).  
 
3. How do agents behave? When agents meet, what do they do? Do they ask other agents 
on dates (Kalick & Hamilton, 1986)? Do they share food (Jahanbazi et al., 2014)? In many 
social science ABMs, agents repeatedly play economic games, which allows for 
experimenters to mathematically approximate real social behavior (Perc & Szolnoski, 
2010). For example, prisoner’s dilemmas can represent people’s decisions to either act 
selfishly or cooperatively. In any ABM, researchers should ensure that agents’ behavior 
approximates the type of social behavior of interest, which often involves programming in 
a degree of randomness for variability. 
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Application of Step 3. In Schelling’s model, agents decided whether to stay in their 
neighborhood or to move to another vacant space on the grid. Gray and colleagues’ agents 
played a prisoner’s dilemma game.   
4. What is the payoff? Payoffs correspond to what agents get out of an interaction, and can 
represent money, happiness, or social bonds. In some ABMs there is no payoff system, but 
in many ABMs that feature interactive decision-making, payoffs are determined by 
considering an agent’s decisions and those of that agent’s partner(s). In a prisoner’s 
dilemma, for example, an agent’s decision to cooperate yields a different payoff 
depending on whether their partner chooses to also cooperate or to defect.  
Application of Step 4. Schelling’s agents received no payoff, since there was no 
interactive decision-making. Gray and colleagues’ agents, however, received a payoff that 
depended on their prisoner’s dilemma decisions.  
5. How do agents change? Agents can change in a number of ways throughout the 
simulation. In many economic models, agents “remember” the way their counterpart 
treated them and adjust their behavior in future rounds. In evolutionary models, each 
round will end with some agents dying (often if they have received a low payoff) or 
reproducing (often if they have received a high payoff). In mating models, agents can pair 
up (or break up). In models where agents form groups, agents can become closer to some 
agents and move further from others. 
Application of Step 5. Both Schelling’s and Gray and colleagues’ agents changed via 
movement, moving to a randomly selected grid space (Schelling) or closer to those who 
treated them nicely (i.e., their friends; Gray and colleagues).  
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6. How long does your world last? As mentioned earlier, one of the major advantages of 
ABMs is their scale. Researchers can collect data for any specified amount of time, 
meaning that an ABM investigation will almost never be underpowered. However, 
researchers should set a theoretically meaningful length to their model. In some cases, 
models should run until they have reached some form of equilibrium. In other cases, 
models should run for a length that approximates some phenomenon of interest (e.g. 
Luhmann & Rajaram’s, 2015, model of collective memory), but still allows the researcher 
to conduct analyses with adequate reliability. In either case, decisions are limited only by 
(practically unlimited) computer storage space and CPU speed.  
Application of Step 6. Both Schelling's and Gray and colleagues’ models ran until a point 
of equilibrium. In Schelling’s model, this equilibrium was the point at which agents were 
no longer moving across neighborhoods. For Gray and colleagues, equilibrium 
represented the point at which agents had all formed groups or group formation was 
impossible.   
7. What do you want to learn from your world? At the end of the day, ABM is a theory- 
testing and development paradigm (Smith & Conrey, 2007) with independent and 
dependent variables. In the case of ABMs, independent variables (or “parameters”) are 
customized by the experimenter, while dependent variables are measured throughout the 
model or at the model’s conclusion. If experimental hypotheses are confirmed, researchers 
should consider adding other independent variables into the model as moderators. Using 
new variables or situations to test the generalizability of a phenomenon is often called a 
“robustness analysis,” and it can reveal surprising new effects or non-linearities. 
AGENT-BASED MODELING 
	   21	  
Application of Step 7. Schelling’s central parameter was agents’ desired similarity, while 
his dependent measures were agents’ positions at the conclusion of the simulation. His 
finding was that a relatively low rate of similarity seeking (~30%) could produce 
relatively homophilous agent distributions at the conclusion of the simulation.  
  In Gray and colleagues’ model of “us and them,” the central parameters were 
agents’ tendency to show reciprocity and transitivity, and the central dependent variable 
was group clustering. Varying parameters and measuring clustering revealed how 
reciprocity and transitivity could produce stable grouping. Gray and colleagues also 
examined a moderating role for “trust”—the baseline tendency for cooperation or 
defection. 
Conclusion 
ABM is not a new technique, but its promise and power are often overlooked by social 
psychologists. We believe that there are two assumptions that have hindered their increased use. 
The first is that ABMs are difficult to learn or understand. However, good ABMs should be easy 
to conceptually understand, and the resources discussed above should make their implementation 
easier. The second assumption is that ABMs fail to generate new knowledge. As we suggest, 
good ABMs harness the power of emergence, in which higher-level phenomena derive from the 
simple behavior of agents. As with any method, ABM is imperfect, but it does offer social 
psychologists a powerful way to implement precise hypotheses and to explore emergence. Not 
only can researchers build whole worlds to examine social processes, they also can sample from 
these worlds over thousands of generations to yield unprecedented insight into collective 
behavior. Whether studying relationships, stereotypes, culture, attitudes, emotions, religion, or 
the self, social psychologists should consider adding ABM to their methodological toolbox.  
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